Landlord and Tenant by Nurenberg, Marshall I.
Case Western Reserve Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Marshall I. Nurenberg, Landlord and Tenant, 8 W. Res. L. Rev. 335 (1957)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol8/iss3/22
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
agreement. The court of appeals held that the judgment for the de-
fendant rendered by the municipal court was justified on the basis of a
finding of fact that the contract was not in force and effect at the time
plaintiff's employment was severed.
EDWIN R. TEPLE
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Lease and License Distinguished
The importance of correctly delineating the legal relationship between
parties was never better illustrated than in the case of Dz Renzo v. Cava-
lier.' One Conti entered into an agreement with the defendant to use the
latter's premises for a period of four and a half hours for a wedding re-
ception. Conti agreed to employ and pay defendant's "regular officer of
the law," to have him "on duty during the party" and to employ and pay
defendant's regular check room attendants. The pay of these employees
was specified in the agreement. During Conti's occupancy, a portion of
the ceiling fell and injured plaintiff, a guest at the reception. Plaintiff
brought a negligence action for his injuries which resulted in a directed
verdict for defendant. The court of appeals reversed and remanded,2
and the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals.
Obviously if the relationship between Conut and defendant was that of
landlord and tenant, then defendant would be in the position of a lessor
out of possession and control and therefore not liable to plaintiff, who
occupied the status of a guest of Conti. It would also follow from these
same relationships that plaintiff as a social guest of Conut would not have
a cause of action against Conti.4
However, both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court recog-
nized the relationship between defendant and Conti as licensor and li-
censee, rather than that of landlord and tenant. The Supreme Court
noted that the presence of defendant's "officer of the law" retained in
defendant a measure of control. Also, and most important, Conti's pos-
session was exclusive only so far as necessary to hold a wedding recep-
tion and went no further.
1165 Ohio St. 386, 135 N.E.2d 394 (1956).
'DiRenzo v. Cavalier, 101 Ohio App. 227, 139 N.B.2d 77 (1956).
'Brown v. Cleveland Baseball Co., 158 Ohio St. 1, 106 N.E.2d 632 (1952), espe-
cially syllabi 2 and 3.
' Scheibel v. Lipton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E. 2d 453 (1951).
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A leasehold creates some estate in the premises, subordinate to the
titde of the landlord, but superior in the right of possession to the entire
world during the term of the lease.5 A license, on the other hand, in-
volves a possessory right only to the extent necessary to carry out the pur-
poses of the license.6 Hence the licensor still retains rights of possession.
It is interesting to note that although as to Conti, plaintiff is a social
guest, as to defendant he is a business invitee.7
Rent Payments Under Defective Lease - Remedies
The difference between legal and equitable relief when there is entry
and payment of rent under a defectively executed lease is thoroughly dis-
cussed in the court of appeals decision in the case of the Walter C. Press-
ing Co., v. Hogan." The original document was a lease for one year, 1943-
44, with options to renew for two additional two year terms. There was
full compliance with the appropriate statutes on execution9 and record-
ing.10 Both options were exercised. However, in 1946 a second docu-
ment was executed, called a renewal lease, for five years from the expira-
tion of the 1943 lease. This latter document was not executed as required
by statute and not recorded. The defendant Hogan continued in occu-
pancy, paid the stated rent, and expended approximately fifteen hundred
dollars on improvements. In 1951 the defendant Lawton executed a lease
for a three year term to plaintiff at a much higher rent. Plaintiff sought
a declaration of its rights. Defendant Hogan prayed that her lease be
declared to be in full force and effect until 1953.
Had legal relief been sought by Hogan the lease would be from month
to month."' In equity, however, a lessee in possession and paying rent
under a defectively executed lease is entitled to hold possession for the full
term of the lease, even though such a judgment nullifies the plain provi-
sions of the statute.12 Thus Hogan was declared to be entitled to posses-
sion until 1953 at the rent recited in her 1946 renewal lease. It is inter-
esting to note that the court of appeals construed the phrase "for a pe-
riod of five years from the expiration date of the present lease" in the
'Pitts v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority, 160 Ohio St. 129, 113 N.E.2d
869 (1953), especially syllabus 2.
032 AM. Ju1-, Landlord and Tenant § 5 (1941).
7Brown v. Cleveland Baseball Co., 158 Ohio St. 1, 106 N.E.2d 632 (1952).
899 Ohio App. 319, 133 N.E.2d 419 (1954)
9 OHio REv. CODE § 5301.01.
11 OHio R v. CODE § 5301.25, construed as to leases in Riley v. Rochester, 105 Ohio
St. 258, 136 N.E. 919 (1922)
'
1 Wineburgh v. Toledo Corp., 125 Ohio St. 219, 181 NE. 20 (1932), especially
syllabus 1.
"O2Io REv. CODE § 5301.01.
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renewal lease to mean commencing from 1948 or after the expiration of
both options in the 1943 lease.
Subrogation Rights of Insurer - Effect of Lease
The effect of a leasehold agreement upon the subrogation rights of a
fire insurance carrier was before the court of appeals in the case of United
States Fire Ins. Co. v. Phil-Mar Corp.13 The insured, Spang Baking Co.,
leased to defendant. Because of the more hazardous business of defend-
ant, the lease provided that lessee pay the additional fire insurance pre-
miums over the lessor's regular rate. The lease further excepted loss by fire
in the delivery and surrender clause. The lessee did in fact occupy the
premises and paid the additional premiums, so that the insurance carrier
received the benefit of the higher rate. Subsequently and during the
leasehold term and possession by lessee, the property was destroyed by
fire by reason of the negligence of lessee. The policy benefits were paid
to the lessor, and the carrier then commenced a subrogation suit against
lessee. The common pleas court granted a motion for a directed verdict
in favor of the lessee which was affirmed by the court of appeals.
The court of appeals reasoned that the lease obviously contemplated
that the lessor should carry adequate fire insurance at the required rate
for the business of lessee, and that lessee should be exempt from loss by
fire which includes a fire negligently started. Inasmuch as the rights of
the subrogating fire insurer can rise no higher than those of the lessor in-
sured, the insurer was relegated to the intent of the parties as manifested
by their lease. This decision seems eminently sound because had the
lessee been the named insured there would have been no basis for a subro-
gation action, and the insurer received the full rate for the risk insured.
Forfeiture Upon Failure to Exercise Option in Lease
The court of appeals' decision in Woodward v. Wagner14 is worthy of
note as it illustrates that the courts will sustain a reasonable forfeiture
provision. The lease recited that for a payment of fifteen hundred dol-
lars, the lessee could exercise an option to purchase the real estate for a
total price of eleven thousand five hundred dollars, i.e. for an additional
ten thousand dollars. If the lessee did not choose to exercise the option,
the fifteen hundred dollars was deemed forfeited. The lessee did not exer-
cise the option and brought suit to recover the forfeiture. A demurrer
was sustained.
' 131 N.E.2d 444 (Ohio App. 1956). This case is also discussed in the INsuiRANiCE
section, supra.
14131 NB.2d 694 (Ohio App. 1955)
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